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DOES THE TSA HAVE STAGE FRIGHT? THEN WHY ARE
THEY PICTURING YOU NAKED?
JULIE SOLOMON*
'%7OU ARE STANDING in the endless security line at the Dal-
Ias/Fort Worth International Airport. After you have
presented your boarding pass and picture identification to a
seemingly bored Transportation Security Administration
("TSA") officer, you proceed to unpack your quart-sized plastic
bag with your liquids and gels that are less than three ounces
and take your laptop computer out of its case and place it in a
bin. After unloading your bags, you start the undressing pro-
cess: you take off your shoes, jacket, belt, watch, and anything
else that might have enough metal to set off the magnetometer
through which you are about to be paraded. You send your
carry-on baggage, plastic bag of travel-sized toiletries (purchased
from the sample section of Target just for your trip), de-cased
laptop computer, and bin of clothing and shoes through the x-
ray machine. Now it is your turn.
With your boarding pass in hand, you close your eyes and take
a deep breath as a security officer waves you through a grey
archway. As you cross the threshold of the magnetometer, you
pray that the underwire of your bra is insufficient to set off the
metal detector. Unfortunately, you are not that lucky, and you
hear the foreboding beep that alerts you that, despite your ef-
forts to dress in your least metallic clothing, you will now have to
stand aside barefoot and shivering (because someone has confis-
cated your belongings, including your sweater and shoes from
the conveyer belt) in front of another security officer while he
passes the "wand" over every square inch of your body. After the
zipper of your beltless jeans sets off the magnetometer again,
you know that you are not getting off so easy-it is time for you
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2009; B.S., Corporate
Communications, University of Texas at Austin, 2005. The author would like to
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go through a pat-down frisk by your friendly TSA officer.' After
being groped and coming out clean, you head to your assigned
gate, feeling completely violated, wondering if that whole pro-
cess makes you feel any safer about the flight you are about to
board. At this point, you may begin to think that with the extra
time and hassle it takes to go through this extensive security reg-
imen, you may have been better off braving a few extra hours in
the comfort (and privacy) of your own car.
The TSA is aware of the hassle of its current screening process
and is committed to experimenting with new technologies that
will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its security
screening.2 The two newest technologies that have been put
into use by the TSA are types of whole body imaging: backscatter
x-ray and millimeter wave imaging.' Both types of imaging are
already in their pilot phases at the Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport
and the TSA has plans to extend the trials of these new technol-
ogies in the near future.4 There is much debate surrounding
the privacy implications of these two new technologies because
of their ability to see much more in-depth than the security mea-
sures, namely the magnetometer x-ray machine, currently in
place at airports across the nation.5 Backscatter technology uses
low energy x-rays that penetrate one quarter of an inch of the
I For a complete description of the standard process for passengers going
through a security checkpoint, see generally TSA: Passenger Security Check-
points, http://www.tsa.dhs.gov/travelers/airtravel/assistant/editorial_l049.shtm
(last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
2 Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA Tests Second Passenger Imaging
Technology at Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport (Oct. 11, 2007), http://www.tsa.gov/
press/releases/2007/pressrelease_10112007.shtm [hereinafter TSA Tests]. TSA
administrator Kip Hawley asserted that the TSA is "committed to testing technol-
ogies that improve security while protecting passenger privacy." Id.
3 See id.
4 See TSA: Whole Body Imaging, http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/body_
imaging.shtm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). The backscatter x-ray passenger imag-
ing technology has been in place at Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport
since February 2007 and the millimeter wave technology testing began in Octo-
ber 2007 at the Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport as well. Id. The TSA plans to further
test these technologies at New York'sJFK International Airport and Los Angeles'
LAX International Airport in the upcoming months. See TSA Tests, supra note 2.
5 See Principles for Evaluating Physical Screening Techniques and Technologies Consis-
tent with Constitutional Norms: Hearing Regarding the U.S. Transportation Security Ad-
ministration's Physical Screening of Airline Passengers and Related Cargo and Airport
Screening Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong.
(2006) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Timothy D. Sparapani, Legislative
Council, American Civil Liberties Union) (expressing concerns that the x-ray
backscatter is too invasive of personal privacy).
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body and scatter back to create a digitized, high-contrast display
on a monitor viewed by TSA agents.6 The millimeter wave ma-
chines may be considered even more intrusive since they use
reflections of beams of radio frequency that are projected over
the body's surface to create a three-dimensional image of the
body for agents to monitor.7 Both machines are currently being
used as voluntary alternatives to pat-down searches to help de-
tect the presence of both metallic and non-metallic devices that
could pose a security threat.8
Courts have generally "upheld the right of the [Federal Avia-
tion Administration] to institute airline passenger screening
procedures, even when those procedures reveal more than just
the presence or absence of dangerous materials or threat ob-
jects" under the U.S. Constitution, federal, and state law.9 The
Ninth Circuit has held that "airport screening searches ... are
constitutionally reasonable administrative searches because they
are 'conducted as part of a general regulatory scheme in fur-
therance of an administrative purpose, namely to prevent the
carrying of weapons or explosives aboard aircraft, and thereby
to prevent hijackings."'' ° However, there is a limit on the scope
of such searches, and once the scope is exceeded, a violation of
the Fourth Amendment has occurred." In considering whether
an airport screening search violates the Fourth Amendment, the
federal courts have relied on the reasonableness of the search. 12
6 SeeTSA: CastScope, http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/castscope.shtm (last
visited Nov. 6, 2007).
7 See TSA: Millimeter Wave, http://wvw.tsa.gov/approach/tech/mwave.shtm
(last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
8 Id.; TSA: CastScope, supra note 6.
9 COMM. ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SEC., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, AIRLINE
PASSENGER SECURITY SCREENING: NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES,
34 (1996), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook/0309054397/html/34.
html.
10 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973)).
II U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
12 See, e.g., Aukai, 497 F.3d at 957; United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 806
(2d Cir. 1974) ("[T]o be reasonable the search must be as limited as possible
commensurate with the performance of its functions."); see also United States v.
Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973) ("Necessity alone, however,
645
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As the threats of an increasingly technological society build up,
courts are more apt to find that security measures, which protect
the traveling public, are reasonable even if the measures come
at the expense of some of the traveling public's privacy. 3 Cur-
rently, the test to determine whether an airport security check-
point search is reasonable enough to pass Fourth Amendment
muster involves the weighing of three factors: "public necessity,
efficacy of the search, and degree of intrusion."1 4
The purpose of this comment is to explore the current state
of the law for airport security and determine how the new tech-
nologies being utilized by the TSA fit within the confines of the
Fourth Amendment's limit on unreasonable searches. In this
comment, I will discuss the backscatter x-ray and millimeter
wave imaging devices in depth and analyze them under the
three prong reasonableness test. Further, I will discuss the pri-
vacy implications of the potentially more invasive imaging sys-
tems and what the TSA plans to do to make the new screening
devices fit within the aforementioned framework.
I. REASONABLENESS OF THE AIRPORT
SCREENING PROCESS
It is universally known that a passenger cannot board a com-
mercial airplane at any airport in the United States without first
going through the standard three step security screening pro-
cess. 5 For the purposes of this comment, I will explore the
screening process as it pertains to a person, not his baggage, and
therefore Step 1 of the process, where a passenger places his
whether produced by danger or otherwise, does not in itself make all non-proba-
ble-cause searches reasonable.").
13 In the post-9/11 world, courts have found that the constitutionality of air-
port screening does not depend on the consent of the passenger. See Aukai, 497
F.3d at 960. This represents a shift in case law which has found a passenger's
consent is not a factor to be considered when determining the reasonableness of
a screening search, as airport screening is standard in today's world where air
piracy is a constant threat. Id.
14 Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275; United States v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d 596,
602 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
15 TSA: Passenger Security Checkpoints, sutpra note 1. According to the TSA,
there is a three step process for passenger security checkpoints which a passenger
"must pass through ... to access [his] departure gate." Id. The TSA website sets
out the three step policy and warns that "[i]f you refuse to be screened at any
point during the screening process, the Security Officer will deny you entry be-
yond the screening area. You will not be able to fly." Id. The three steps include
sending personal belongings through an x-ray machine (for carry-on baggage),
walking through a metal detector, and additional screening. Id.
646
2008] NEW AIRPORT SCREENING TECHNOLOGY 647
carry-on baggage through the x-ray machine, is not relevant to
this discussion. 6 Step 2 of the TSA's screening process involves
walking through a metal detector, or an optional pat-down in-
spection. 7 If a passenger sets off the metal detector, or is ran-
domly chosen for additional screening, he will move on to Step
3 which "includes a hand-wand inspection in conjunction with a
pat-down.' '  There is no issue as to whether this process consti-
tutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, as courts have
consistently held that the airport screening process is in fact a
search."9 The pat-down procedure, which has been compared
to a frisk, has been subject to questions of constitutionality, yet
courts repeatedly have found that so long as the proscribed pro-
cess is followed and the intrusion is minimal, the benefit of
safety outweighs the invasion of privacy.2 ° In the landmark case,
Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court began using Justice
Harlan's privacy test which involved a twofold requirement:
"first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expec-
tation of privacy, and second, the expectation must be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 2' Thus, in or-
der to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment, an intrusion
would have to be violative of something that society is willing to
recognize is a reasonable expectation of privacy.
16 Id.
17 Id. The TSA recommends that passengers pack all metal items, including
those in the passenger's pockets, before walking through the metal detector in
order to prevent setting off the alarm. Id.
18 Id. Additional screening is conducted by a screener of the same gender as
the person being screened. Id. Further, the passenger may request that his
search be conducted in private. Id. The pat-down inspection "may include sensi-
tive areas of the body. Id. Security Officers are rigorously trained to maintain the
highest levels of professionalism." Id.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 803 (2d Cir. 1974) ("Even
the unintrusive magnetometer walk-through is a search in that it searches for and
discloses metal items within areas most intimate to the person where there is a
normal expectation of privacy."); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769, 770
(4th Cir. 1972) ("[T]he use of the magnetometer... was a 'search' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
20 United States v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d 596, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (citing
United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973)). "Little controversy
exists regarding ... public necessity and efficacy of the [airport screening]
search. The need to deter and prevent airplane hijacking is 'unquestionably
grave and urgent."' Id.
21 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (expanding on the major-
ity's holding that the "Fourth Amendment protects people, not places," and not-
ing that what protection a person expects often hinges on what expectation of
privacy is appropriate for the place of the alleged violation of privacy).
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Courts engage in various balancing tests to determine
whether an airport search is reasonable. Former judge, Justice
Friendly, expressed his sentiments on the reasonableness of air-
port searches and the lower level of constitutional scrutiny they
should be afforded in light of danger to passengers:
Determination of what is reasonable requires a weighing of the
harm against the need. When the object of the search is simply
the detection of past crime, probable cause to arrest is generally
the appropriate test .... When the risk is the jeopardy to hun-
dreds of human lives and millions of dollars of property inherent
in the pirating or blowing up of a large airplane, the danger alone
meets the test of reasonableness, so long as the search is con-
ducted in good faith for the purpose of preventing hijacking or
like damage and with reasonable scope and the passenger has
been given advance notice of his liability to such a search so that
he can avoid it by choosing not to travel by air.22
The Fifth Circuit tookJustice Friendly's good faith test one step
further and judged reasonableness not just by necessity, but by
balancing three generalized factors applicable to all passengers
at the security checkpoint: (1) public necessity, (2) efficacy of
search, and (3) degree of intrusion. 2' The court in Skipwith ac-
knowledged that the intrusion that an "airport search imposes
on the public is not insubstantial. It is inconvenient and annoy-
ing, in some cases it may be embarrassing. '24 The Fifth Circuit
did not leave us to stew on how inconvenient and annoying air-
port searches are because it suggested several factors which miti-
gate the offensiveness of an airport screening search in relation
to searches performed in other contexts, 25 which include: the
"absence of any stigma" of being searched at an airport,26 the
22 United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 675 (2d Cir. 1972).
23 See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973). The Fifth
Circuit described its test for reasonableness of a search as follows:
Reasonableness requires that the courts must weigh more than the
necessity of the search in terms of possible harm to the public. The
equation must also take into account the likelihood that the search
procedure will be effective in averting the potential harm. On the
opposite balance we must evaluate the degree and nature of intru-




25 Id. at 1275-76.
26 Id. at 1275. All people who wish to board a commercial airplane are subject
to the search, thus there is no stigma that would embarrass a passenger since all
passengers are searched. See id.
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choice of a passenger to put himself in a position where he
would be searched (by choosing to fly), and the circumstances
under which an airport search occurs.27
In application, courts have generally held that the TSA's
screening process is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
so long as the security officers follow the proscribed procedure
to the extent that they attempt to use the least intrusive path.28
In a post-9/11 world, society no longer has a reasonable expec-
tation of complete privacy at the airport;29 however, it is only fair
that passengers be able to maintain some degree of privacy, as
can be achieved when screeners use the least intrusive means
available. The Second Circuit ruled that even at a pre-boarding
checkpoint, the government must utilize the least intrusive
means available to resolve the single alarm; it is only when they
have exhausted other means of searching that a frisk is appro-
priate. ° In the event that a frisk is deemed to be necessary by
the TSA agents, there is no violation of the Fourth Amendment
for such a search in the absence of a warrant because, in the
case of airport security, courts lower the standard and find ex-
ceptions to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment 3' due
to the "compelling need for a search to detect weapons before
they are brought on an airplane. 32  The court in Albarado
summed up the balance:
27 Id. at 1275-76. Unlike searches by the police outside of the airport context
(which are subject to the standard Fourth Amendment protections), where sub-
jects are often searched in dark isolated areas and the only witnesses are the party
being searched and the officer, in the airport context, the searches are made
under the "scrutiny of the traveling public." Id.
28 See, e.g., United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 809 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding
that frisking of defendant immediately after he activated a magnetometer, rather
than requesting him to remove metal objects and walk through the magnetome-
ter a second time, was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment because the
search was not minimally intrusive); United States v. Roman-Marcon, 832 F.
Supp. 24, 27 (D.P.R. 1993) (holding that there was no violation of a defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights when, after he activated the magnetometer on a walk-
through and also activated the hand-wand magnetometer, a security officer
touched defendant's clothing where there was a bulge from the object that set off
the magnetometers).
29 Roger Clark, The Inalienable Right to ly, 29 L.A. LAW. 60 (2006). ("[O]ur
'societal expectations' have changed. . . .We now accept what is essentially a
micro-police state in an airport, giving up our right of free speech and giving up
our right to be free of search except upon probable cause.").
30 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 808.
31 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
32 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 805. In the past, scholars and courts have tried to fit
airport security into one of the recognized exceptions to the Warrant Clause of
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[N]either component of the usual airport search of the person-
the use of the magnetometer or the frisk-seems to fit readily
within any of the traditional exceptions to the warrant require-
ment, and yet each seems reasonable in light of the overwhelm-
ing public acceptance of the search, and the necessity for it.3 3
Thus, the public necessity factor of the balancing test is usually
persuasive enough to tip the scales in favor of more intrusion
than is traditionally allowed under the Fourth Amendment.34
However, the Second Circuit does not automatically give li-
cense for TSA officers to do whatever they wish-there is only a
window of reasonableness: "[w]hile this [compelling need]
might justify some search of all prospective passengers at an air-
port, the question becomes whether it will justify in any give case
the search as carried out.''3 5 This weighs in to the degree of
intrusion factor from Skipwith.36 If the search is carried out in a
manner that is too intrusive, the compelling need may not be
strong enough to justify more than a minimal invasion of a pas-
the Fourth Amendment. These include the "Terry Stop-and-Frisk Exception,"
the "Consent Exception," the "Katz Expectation of Privacy Exception," and the
"Border Search Exception." But courts have found that these are hard to apply
to airport security issues because of the unique nature of air piracy and the com-
pelling need for heightened security of all passengers. See Steven R. Minert,
Comment, Square Pegs, Round Hole: The Fourth Amendment and Preflight Searches of
Airline Passengers in a Post-9/11 World, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1631, 1637-60 (2006)
for an in-depth analysis of each exception and the reasons why each is inapplica-
ble in the airport security context. Further, courts have acknowledged that pas-
senger consent is no longer necessary for a search to be reasonable. See United
States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 2007).
33 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 803-04.
34 See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973). Courts
have allowed more leniency for airport searches because they are handled as "ad-
ministrative, 'special governmental need"' searches. See David A. Harris, Super-
man's X-ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The New Gun Detection Technology, 69
TEMP. L. REV. 1, 49 (1996). The public's interest in the government's screening
is strong:
Of course, a special need to search everyone, beyond the needs of
normal law enforcement, virtually leaps out of the cases on magne-
tometer searches: the special need to prevent and deter air piracy.
Simply put, there is no other way to come close to avoiding com-
pletely the extremely dangerous prospect of an airline hijacking or
the planting of an explosive on an aircraft .... [C]ourts have found
that airport security searches of all passengers using magnetome-
ters meet the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 49-51.
35 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 805; see also, Aukai, 497 F.3d at 962 ("[T]he constitu-
tionality of airport screening . . . is not limitless.").
36 See Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275.
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senger's privacy. 7 Although the fact that all passengers are sub-
ject to a frisk, or pat-down, does not make the pat-down any less
of an invasion of privacy, several courts have noted that the inva-
siveness may be mitigated because being searched at an airport
does not carry the stigma that exists in other search contexts.3
While a frisk is subject to analysis under the degree of intru-
sion factor, the walk-through magnetometer itself does not pose
such a problem, as it is generally recognized as minimally inva-
sive to the privacy of a passenger:39 there is no "probing into an
individual's private life and thoughts"4"' and "[t]he use of the
device does not annoy, frighten or humiliate those who pass
through it."' 41 However, the magnetometer alone is inefficient
and needs to be used in conjunction with more intrusive screen-
ing methods to maximize its effectiveness.42 The ineffectiveness
of the magnetometer makes the use of more intrusive screening
tactics more justifiable:
There is, of course, a compelling need for further investigation
after an initial magnetometer reading showing metal. Without
further investigation the magnetometer would not serve any valid
purpose. It would be absurd to require the airlines either to
deny passage to everyone activiating [sic] the magnetometer or
to allow passage to any without discovering what the metal was.4"
37 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 799. The Second Circuit felt that by immediately frisk-
ing Mr. Albarado after he set off the magnetometer only once without sending
him through the machine again nor screening him with the "wand," the TSA
agents had been overly intrusive upon his person and thus, found that the frisk
was in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. However, in United States v. Hart-
well, the Third Circuit held that a search of a passenger was minimally invasive
since it was "well-tailored to protect personal privacy, escalating in invasiveness
only after a lower level of screening disclosed a reason to conduct a more prob-
ing search." 436 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2006).
38 See, e.g., Albarado, 495 F.2d at 807; Skipwith, 482 F.2d at 1275.
39 See United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667, 673 (2d Cir. 1972). ("In view of the
magnitude of the crime sought to be prevented, the exigencies of time which
clearly precluded the obtaining of a warrant, the use of the magnetometer is in
our view a reasonable caution."); United States v. Roman-Marcon, 832 F. Supp.
24, 26 (D.P.R. 1993) ("[S]ince the invasion of the privacy constituted by a mea-
suring of the distortion of magnetic waves around their body is so minimal,
courts have found that an administrative search with a magnetometer does not
constitute a constitutional violation.").
40 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
41 Albarado, 495 F.2d at 806.
42 Id. at 805. "[A]ll passengers are searched, but only a fraction of one per
cent [sic] have weapons. The magnetometer, although calibrated supposedly to
be activated by a mass of metal approximating a .25 calibre pistol, often is acti-
vated by car keys, ladies' sewing scissors, briefcase hinges and latches." Id.
43 Id. at 808.
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It is clear that courts approve of the TSA conducting further
screening in excess of just a one-time magnetometer walk-
through. Now the question becomes how far the TSA can in-
trude into a passenger's privacy in its attempt to find more effec-
tive ways to serve the compelling purpose of protecting the
traveling public.
II. THE NEW TECHNOLOGY: MORE EFFICIENT AND
EFFECTIVE, BUT MORE OR LESS INTRUSIVE?
In order to keep pace in a world where dangers are "not con-
fined to the cumbersome gun or knife,"44 the TSA is faced with
the challenges of meeting the security needs of the traveling
public and trying to prevent air terrorism while at the same time
attempting to stay within the confines of the Fourth Amend-
ment. The TSA is stuck in a "catch-22" where people are resent-
ful of the intrusion upon their privacy presented by airport
security screening, yet when a security crisis strikes, it is the TSA
who has not fulfilled its duty of properly screening passengers.
The TSA is charged with ensuring "the safety of all passengers
and [maintaining] the integrity of the sterile area, which cannot
be accomplished unless all alarms triggered at the checkpoint
are resolved prior to permitting a passenger to leave the secure
area."
45
In order to ensure the safety and maintain the integrity of the
sterile area,46 the TSA has crafted new ways which it believes will
serve to better screen passengers. The backscatter and millime-
ter wave scanners are two new technologies currently being
tested by the TSA to detect contraband on passengers during
secondary screening as a voluntary alternative to a pat-down
44 United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 49 (5th Cir. 1973) ("[M]odern tech-
nology has made it possible to miniaturize to such a degree that enough plastic
explosive to blow up an airplane can be concealed in a toothpaste tube. A deto-
nator planted in a fountain pen is all that is required to set it off.... It is in this
context that we must assess the constitutionality of the search.").
45 United States v. Hartwell, 296 F. Supp. 2d 596, 605 (E.D. Pa. 2003). Since
2001, the TSA has been mandated by federal law to screen passengers to ensure
that prohibited people and items do not board commercial airliners. See TSA:
Passenger Screening, http://ivav.tsa.dhs.gov/whatVe do/screening/security_
checkpoints.shtm (last visited Jan. 18, 2008).
46 49 C.F.R. § 1540.5 (2007). The "secured area" is the "portion of an airport,
specified in the [TSA] airport security program ... where aircraft operators and
foreign air carriers... enplane and deplane passengers." Id. The "sterile area" is
the area within the secured area that "provides passengers access to boarding
aircraft and to which the access generally is controlled by TSA ... through the
screening of persons and property." Id.
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search.47 This section will discuss these new technologies, the
various privacy measures in place to protect passengers, as well
as the criticisms and problems related to each device.
A. X-RAY BACKSCATTER
Since February 2007, the Phoenix Sky Harbor International
Airport has been testing the x-ray backscatter machine.4" One
year later, approximately seventy-nine percent of passengers had
opted to undergo the new backscatter imaging screening in lieu
of the traditional pat-down search upon setting off the walk-
through magnetometer. 49 According to the TSA, "[t]his new
technology can detect weapons, explosives and other metallic
and non-metallic threat items concealed under layers of cloth-
ing without physical contact" and they have "applied multiple
protections for passengers' privacy. 50 The x-ray backscatter
screening process takes less than one minute and consists of two
separate scans in which a passenger stands in front of the x-ray
backscatter unit and remains still for approximately ten seconds
as the technology scans the passenger's body to create an image
of the body and objects located upon it (with one scan facing
the machine and one scan facing away) .51 TSA Administrator
Kip Hawley sees the x-ray backscatter as having "potential to be a
valuable tool in our layered security approach. 52
1. How X-ray Backscatter Technology Works
The backscatter unit scans a narrow, low-intensity x-ray beam
over the passenger's body at a high speed.5 ' The radiation from
the x-ray is reflected (scattered) back from the passenger's body
and other objects that may be carried on the passenger's body
and is converted into a high-contrast computer image and dis-
played on a monitor.54 The computer image is embedded with
a modesty filter and is viewed from a remote location. 55 All
47 See TSA: Whole Body Imaging, supra note 4.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Press Release, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA Unveils Backscatter Technology
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items that a passenger is carrying on his body, including both
metallic and non-metallic objects, will be displayed on the
monitor.56
The radiation involved is low intensity and the amount emit-
ted during one scan of the backscatter x-ray portal is "equivalent
to approximately 15 minutes of exposure to naturally-occurring
background radiation from sources such as the sun's rays." 57
Backscatter x-rays differ from medical x-rays, because unlike
medical x-rays that penetrate the entire body, backscatter x-rays
only penetrate approximately one quarter of an inch of the
body before the rays are scattered. 58 This results in significantly
less exposure to radiation, so passengers can leave their lead
vests at home!
2. Privacy Measures
The TSA has put several privacy measures in to place for the
implementation of this new technology. The image displayed
on the screen does not show much more than an outline of the
passenger's body; the TSA has worked closely with the vendors
of the backscatter machines to modify the image of a passenger
that is taken to ensure the image produced is not too detailed
an image of the personal details of a passenger's anatomy and
unique physical characteristics.5 9 And, the officer on-site at the
machine that has contact with the passenger does not see the
image-only an officer in a remote location is able to view the
image, and even then, is unable to associate the image displayed
with the passenger being screened.6 ° Further, the device is not
capable of storing, printing, or transmitting the image; once the
officer has viewed the image and resolved any issues with the
passenger's scan, the picture is erased permanently and the re-
mote officer signals to the on-site officer with a green light.6
The TSA Office of Privacy Policy and Compliance claims that
because the backscatter limits the need for a pat-down during
56 Press Release, TSA Unveils Backscatter Technology Testing at Phoenix Sky
Harbor Airport, supra note 50. "TSA's privacy-filtered image looks like a chalk
outline of the person's body, and shows any concealed items including weapons,
explosives and other metallic and non-metallic threat items." Id.
57 Id.
58 TSA: CastScope, supra note 6.
59 TSA: Office of Privacy Policy and Compliance, http://www.tsa.gov/re-
search/privacy/backscatter/shtm (last visited Jan. 15, 2008).
6 Press Release, TSA Unveils Backscatter Technology Testing at Phoenix Sky
Harbor Airport, supra note 50.
61 TSA: Whole Body Imaging, supra note 4.
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secondary screenings, this technology is actually less invasive
since it minimizes the need for physical contact. 62
3. Criticisms of Backscatter Technology
Many people are concerned that the backscatter technology is
overly invasive. The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
Legislative Council, Timothy D. Sparapani, testified before the
U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion about the ACLU's concerns regarding these searches,
equating the technology to "Superman's X-ray vision" which is
"capable of projecting a high-resolution image of a passenger's
naked body."6 The ACLU urged Congress to prohibit this new
technology as a part of TSA's screening process, arguing that
"[p]assengers expect privacy underneath their clothing and
should not be required to display highly personal details of their
bodies-such as evidence of mastectomies, colostomy appli-
ances, penile implants, catheter tubes, and the size of their
breasts or genitals-as a prerequisite to boarding a plane. '"64
Critics also argue that the backscatter is not going to be any
more effective than the current screening process, so the effi-
ciency does not help counterbalance the intrusion on privacy.6 5
Their concern is that the x-ray backscatter will lead to an in-
crease in the number of passenger screening delays and will
prompt more subsequent searches of passengers.66 In its testi-
mony to Congress, the ACLU illustrated this concern:
[A] n image projected by X-ray backscatter that may look like a
concealed gun or explosive device carried on a person will re-
quire TSA screeners to put the person through: (a) a conven-
tional metal detector; (b) an explosives detection "puffer"
machine; or (c) both. Further, even if an object is identified,
TSA screeners will then need to pat the individual in question
down and likely ask them to remove their clothing to verify what
the object in question may be. Even the presence of a seemingly
innocuously shaped item, such as a prosthetic device or implant,
will require subsequent (and potentially humiliating)
verification.67
62 TSA: Office of Privacy Policy and Compliance, supra note 59.
63 Hearing, supra note 5.
64 Id. While Sparapani urges Congress to prohibit the backscatter technology
for individual screening, he recognizes the "tremendous potential to screen
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Thus, the ACLU contends that the "backscatter requires a tre-
mendous invasion of privacy with little speed or efficiency
gains."" If the ACLU's contentions are true, this may diminish
the constitutionality of the backscatter under the Fourth
Amendment because it weakens the benefit element while in-
creasing the intrusion element of the Skipwith balancing test.6 9
B. MILLIMETER WAVE
The TSA began its pilot program of the millimeter wave tech-
nology at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport on Oc-
tober 11, 2007.7° It has been popular with the traveling public,
with an approximately ninety percent acceptance rate thus far.7'
Like the x-ray backscatter, this machine will be a voluntary alter-
native to a passenger undergoing a pat-down during secondary
screening.72 The millimeter wave unit is a machine that a pas-
senger must step into and remain still for a few seconds in two
different positions as two antennas rotate around the body to
create a three-dimensional image. 73 This screening process will
be able to "detect weapons, explosives and other threat items
concealed under layers of clothing without physical contact. 74
Craig Coy, the President of L-3 Communications' Homeland Se-
curity Group, which makes the machine being tested in Phoe-
nix, claims the machine is "fast and effective and has the
potential to strengthen security at the nation's transportation
hubs, while protecting passengers' privacy. 75
68 Id.
6 See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).
70 TSA Tests, supra note 2. The TSA plans to test this technology further at Los
Angeles International Airport and New York's John F. Kennedy International Air-
port. See id. The millimeter wave technology is already in place in several inter-
national transportation settings, including airports in the U.K., Spain, Japan,
Australia, Mexico, Thailand, and the Netherlands. TSA: Millimeter Wave, supra
note 7. The technology is also being used in various government locations across
the United States, including the Federal Courthouse in Virginia, the Colorado
Springs Courthouse, the Department of Corrections facility in Pennsylvania, the
Los Angeles County Courthouse, and the Cook County Courthouse in Illinois.
Id.
71 TSA Chiefs Goal: Win Back the Passengers, CONG. Q., Jan. 18, 2008, http://
www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/tsa-wins-passengers.shtm.
72 See TSA Tests, supra note 2.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Press Release, L-3 Commc'ns, TSA to Test L-3 Millimeter Wave Portals at
Phoenix Sky Harbor Airport (Oct. 11, 2007), http://www.globalsecurity.org/se-
curity/library/news/2007/10/sec-071011-1-3comm0l.htm.
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1. How the Millimeter Wave Technology Works
The millimeter wave portal projects beams of radio frequency
energy in the millimeter wave spectrum over a passenger's body
at a high speed via two rotating antennas. 76 The radio fre-
quency energy is then reflected back off of the body or other
objects on a person's body to create a three-dimensional image
which is displayed on a remote monitor.77 Millimeter waves
bounce back to create the image in only 1.8 seconds. 7 The de-
vice "measur[es] the differences in the passive millimeter waves
as the waves pass through an individual's body" and can detect
the differences in flesh, metal, and plastic shapes.79 The image
looks like a "fuzzy photo negative" ° and outlines a person's
body in light gray, while shapes of weapons and other foreign
objects appear in a darker shade."'
The process involves a passenger walking into the millimeter
wave portal and standing still in two different positions for a few
seconds while the antennas rotate around the passenger and
create "a three-dimensional image of the passenger in real-
time."" Once the scan is complete, the passenger may exit the
opposite side of the portal.8 3 The three-dimensional image of
the passenger will blur out facial features and be displayed on a
remote monitor for analysis.8 4 After it has been viewed, the im-
age will be deleted immediately.8 5 The millimeter wave portal
used in the pilot at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International Air-
port uses millimeter wave technology that:
[P] inpoints objects made of any material, including liquids, rub-
ber, wire, plastic, and metal, to quickly and easily locate weapons,
contraband, and other threats concealed under an individual's
clothing. The portals detect concealed and hidden objects such
76 See TSA: Millimeter Wave, supra note 7.
77 Id.
78 See Cullen Dirner, TSA Rolls Out Na Screening Technology, ABC NEWS, Oct. 11,
2007, http://abcnews.go.com/technology/story?id=3716917&page=l.
79 Alyson L. Rosenberg, Comment, Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging: A New
Weapon in the Fight Against Crime or A Fourth Amendment Violation?, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. &
TECH. 135, 139 (1998). Different materials emit at different strengths: "[f]or in-
stance, metal objects are poor emitters while flesh is an especially good emitter."
Id.
80 TSA Tests, supra note 2.
81 Harris, supra note 34, at 11.
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as metallic and non-metallic weapons and virtually all known ex-
plosives, and other contraband in seconds.8 6
The electromagnetic waves emitted over the body are harm-
less; millimeter wave energy is emitted by everyday objects, such
as cell phones, televisions, radios, and even the sun. 7 In fact,
the energy emitted by the millimeter wave portal is "10,000
times less than a cell phone," which nearly all passengers expose
themselves to much more frequently than airport screening de-
vices."8 Further, this technology uses low energy radio waves in-
stead of high energy x-rays used by the x-ray backscatter.89 The
radiation emitted from the millimeter wave portal is non-ioniz-
ing and thus does not cause tissue damage; therefore, it is argua-
bly superior to the x-ray backscatter in regard to individuals who
are repeatedly inspected,9" such as pilots, flight attendants, and
other airport personnel who may be scanned several times a day.
2. Privacy Measures
The TSA is committed to testing technology that will improve
the level of security offered to the traveling public while at the
same time protecting their privacy. TSA administrator Kip
Hawley explained that "[p]rivacy is ensured through the ano-
nymity of the image: It will never be stored, transmitted, or
printed, and it will be deleted immediately once viewed."'"
Thus, to ensure privacy, TSA officers will view the images (which
are embedded with a security algorithm to mask the face of each
passenger) from a remote location where they can communi-
86 Press Release, L-3 Commc'ns, supra note 75.
87 See TSA: Millimeter Wave, supra note 7. The TSA's spokeswoman, Elle
Howe, has called the process harmless and more effective than a magnetometer
in that '[a] magnetometer only picks up metal or weapons, so this could see
other materials that might be hidden on the body and it also produces an image'
rather than just a beep." Richard Koman, New Airport Scanning Tech Might be a
Little Too Revealing, ZDNET, Oct. 11, 2007, http://government.zdnet.com/?p=
3436.
88 TSA Tests, supra note 2.
89 See Amsterdam Airport Says Introduction of Radio Wave Security Scanners Has Gone
Smoothly, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 16, 2007, http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?
id=5737469.
9o COMM. ON ASSESSMENT OF SEC. TECHS. FOR TRANSP., NAT'L RESEARCH COUN-
CIL, ASSESSMENT OF MILLIMETER-WAVE AND TERAHERTZ TECHNOLOGY FOR DETEC-
TION AND IDENTIFICATION OF CONCEALED EXPLOSIVES AND WEAPONS 54 (2007),
available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=11826&page=54.
91 Thomas Claburn, TSA Promises Privacy for Subjects of Clothing-Penetrating Scans,
INFO. WK., Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/gov-
ernment/showArticle.j html?articlelD=202401630.
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cate with the on-site officer if that person presents a potential
threat.1
2
The fuzzy, three-dimensional image created by the millimeter
wave technology is a lower resolution than the image created by
the x-ray backscatter discussed above." Thus, privacy may be
less of a concern for travelers. However, although faces are
blurred, chests and crotches are not, since according to Amster-
dam Schiphol Airport's spokeswoman Miriam Snoerwang, oth-
erwise "'women could just hide things by stuffing them in their
bras.'- 94 Thus, while the millimeter wave technology has the ca-
pability to create a potentially necessary vivid image of passen-
gers, the TSA has attempted to ensure that passengers' privacy
will be protected by both the privacy algorithm and the process
by which the technology will be used.
3. Criticisms of Millimeter Wave Technology
ACLU Director, Barry Steinhardt has equated a scan in the
millimeter wave portal to "virtual strip-searches."95 The National
Research Council issued a report entitled Airline Passenger Secur-
ity Screening: New Technologies and Implementations Issues which dis-
cussed the privacy issues:
[T]he images produced by these technologies are of sufficiently
high quality to make them effective for screening passengers.
However, when the perceived level of threat is low, passengers,
crews, and others passing through screening checkpoints are
likely to object to having images of their bodies displayed. There
are also likely to be concerns about the use and storage of the
data used to generate the images. Procedures, such as having
operators of same sex view the images or moving operators away
from the screening checkpoints, could allay concerns. However,
for financial and logistical reasons, these procedures are likely to
make imaging technologies extremely unattractive for use as pri-
mary screening systems at all checkpoints. Quantifying the level
of threat at which people are likely to accept this kind of invasion
of privacy is difficult but necessary prior to mandating the use of
any imaging technology for screening passengers at airports.96
92 TSA Tests, supra note 2.
93 See TSA: Millimeter Wave, supra note 7.
94 Amsterdam Airport Says Introduction of Radio Wave Security Scanners Has Gone
Smoothly, supra note 89. Snoerwang also contends that the images generated by
the millimeter wave portal in use at the Amsterdam Airport are not like photo-
graphs, but are "kind of futuristic. There's nothing sexy about it." Id.
95 See Dirner, supra note 78.
96 COMM. ON COMMERCIAL AVIATION SEC., supra note 9, at 4.
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Steinhardt expressed his concern about the "strikingly graphic
images of passengers' bodies" which "reveal not only our private
body parts, but also intimate medical details like colostomy bags.
That degree of examination amounts to a significant-and for
some people humiliating-assault on the essential dignity of
passengers that citizens in a free nation should not have to toler-
ate."97 Steinhardt and others do not find the TSA's assurances
of privacy persuasive, as they caution the public to be wary of the
graphic images obtained by a millimeter wave scan and of the
possibility that the TSA officers would save "images of celebri-
ties" or the possibility that TSA may "unilaterally decide to stop
blurring faces."9 8
Critics also challenge the voluntariness of the scan. 99 TSA as-
sumes that people who consent to the use of the millimeter wave
alternative to a pat-down "understand what they're consenting
to, and that it will long remain something over which passengers
will be allowed to exercise any choice at all."' 100 Thus, to pre-
serve the Fourth Amendment constitutionality of the millimeter
wave portal, it would be wise for Congress to provide some sort
of restrictions on the TSA and their policies surrounding this
new screening device. ACLU Director of Technology and Lib-
erty Program, Barry Steinhardt, said that the ACLU would "like
to see strong independent and legally binding assurance that
the [privacy] policy will be enforced and unchanged."' It is
likely that passengers would also like to see such assurances.
Critics are also concerned that the technology is a waste of
money "because the results will be minimally better than the
current screening process.' 10 2 TSA has stated that it will
97 Claburn, supra note 91.
98 Koman, supra note 87; see also Dimer, supra note 78. Steinhardt has been
quoted with his concerns that "[t] hey say that they are obscuring faces, but that is
just a software fix that can be undone as easily as it is applied, [a]nd obscuring
faces does not hide the fact that the rest of the body will be vividly displayed."
Monisha Bansal, Full Body Airport X-Rays Expensive, Raise Privacy Concerns, CNS
NEWS.COM, Oct. 15, 2007, http://www.cnsnews.com. Jim Harper, Director of In-
formation Policy Studies at Cato Institute, agrees with Steinhardt: "Over time, the
personnel operating this system will get mischievous, and it will be misused in
ways that are very offensive." 1I.
99 Press Release, Barry Steinhardt, Dir. of ACLU Tech. and Liberty Program,




102 See Bansal, supra note 98. James Carafano, a senior research fellow at the
Heritage Foundation, is not concerned that there is a civil liberties issue here; he
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purchase eight millimeter wave imaging units for $1.7 million to
use for additional pilot tests (including tests at New York's John
F. Kennedy Airport and Los Angeles International Airport)." 3
However, people are concerned that the additional security
layer from the millimeter wave portal will fail to make air travel
that much safer because it is impossible "to keep every bad thing
off a plane-unless people fly naked and are asleep, [t]here are
still people that could use their thumb and could kill you. 1104
Thus, it is clear from this section's demonstration of the tech-
nology, the privacy safeguards and concerns over these safe-
guards, and costs, that the use of this new technology in airports
will unleash much legal debate and give cause for much greater
analysis under a reasonableness standard.
III. APPLYING THE BALANCING TEST TO THE NEW
SCREENING TECHNOLOGIES
There has already been commentary on the use of backscatter
x-ray and millimeter wave technology in the context of gun de-
tection by police outside the airport setting. This technology
was first proposed for use by local law enforcement agents to
establish probable cause of someone possessing a weapon in or-
der to obtain a search warrant.0 5 Professor James Wilson was
the first to encourage scientists to create a device to be able to
detect weapons on people or in their homes.' 6 After President
Clinton read Wilson's article he sent it to Attorney General Ja-
net Reno, who then brought it to the attention of the National
Institute of Justice ("NIJ"). l0 In 1995, the NIJ, a subsection of
the Department ofJustice that awards grants to assist in research
and development for law enforcement, l08 awarded a grant of
$2.15 million to three companies to develop new technology for
is more worried about the expense of the technology in relation to its effective-
ness. Id.
103 TSA Tests, supra note 2.
104 Bansal, supra note 98. Carafano does not believe that we should rely on
TSA agents to prevent every bad or dangerous object from getting on an air-
plane. Id. He does not believe this is "the biggest bang for [our] security buck."
Id.
105 Roberto Iraola, New Detection Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 47 S.D.
L. REv. 8, 11 (2002).
106 James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at
647, available at 1994 WLNR 3506775.
107 See Harris, supra note 34, at 6-7.
108 See id. at 7.
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gun detection. 09 One of these companies, Millitech Corpora-
tion, created a millimeter wave scanner.110
The original use for the millimeter wave scanner was very con-
troversial because police were scanning people on the street and
in their homes.111 Because there is not a compelling or special
governmental need cited as there is in the airport context, it is
hard to justify the use of this technology because it is not likely
to be found within society's reasonable expectations. 1 2 It is un-
likely that people will think it is reasonable to expect to be arbi-
trarily searched by millimeter wave technology while walking
down the street or in the privacy of their home by a machine
that can penetrate clothes and walls."' When a court applies
the three factor reasonableness test, the degree of intrusion is
likely too strong and outweighs the efficacy or public necessity
in the setting for which the technology was originally developed.
However, while the new invasive technologies are probably
not appropriate for cops wandering the streets to prey on unsus-
pecting citizens, they are likely appropriate for airport security
screening purposes. Assuming Congress and the TSA heed to
ACLU Director Barry Steinhardt's advice of placing stringent
procedural limitations and legal assurances in place," 4 this tech-
nology has the potential to be effective in serving the strong gov-
ernmental need of keeping air travel safe, despite its
infringement on passengers' privacy.
This section will weigh the three factors of reasonableness-
degree of intrusion, public necessity, and efficacy-as they per-
tain to the whole body imaging technologies that are being im-
plemented in airports across the country. While critics of the
millimeter wave and backscatter technologies argue that it is
overly intrusive, members of the public must look at this new
technology in comparison with the current pat-down procedure
that they would otherwise have to undergo. No doubt there is a
public need not only for heightened security that is receptive to
the threats of today, but also for technologies that are more ef-
109 Rosenberg, supra note 79, at 138.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 136.
112 As presented in the privacy test of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967), and accompanying text.
113 Harris, supra note 34, at 9. The gun detectors operate from a remote loca-
tion, are portable, and can "see" through clothing and sometimes other materi-
als. Id.
114 Press Release, Barry Steinhardt, supra note 99.
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fective and targeted than the current screening process. One of
the main complaints of the traveling public is the hassle of the
current screening process, which many passengers may view as a
series of petty inconveniences. When going through security, it
is hard to understand why it is safer for my mascara and lip gloss
to be in a quart-sized bag with my three-ounce contact solution
than in my makeup bag with my blush and eyeliner. And if I
forget to take my rewetting drops out of my purse and put them
in the bag, is it really necessary to hold up the entire line just so
the TSA agent can go through the contents of my entire purse
and either throw the drops away or place them in the Ziploc
baggie for me? And what on earth could I possibly be smug-
gling in my thin little flip flops? Passengers are sick of the hassle
and the TSA is sick of being the "bad guy." It is clear that the
TSA has moved in the right direction in seeking out new tech-
nologies that will hopefully end the era of the Ziploc bag and
the shoeless walk-through, and it is likely that the whole body
imaging will pass constitutional muster under the reasonable-
ness test.
A. DEGREE OF INTRUSION
There is no denying that the level of intrusion upon a passen-
ger opting to be screened via the new x-ray backscatter machine
or millimeter wave portal is high. But is it really higher than the
privacy invasion a passenger experiences when he is selected for
secondary screening and must undergo the pat-down search?
To answer this, we must decide whether we would prefer to be
violated by a TSA officer's hands or eyes. Do we want to look
him or her in the eye as he or she runs his or her hands up and
down our entire body? Or would we rather stand and chat with
a TSA agent who is not touching us while his or her colleague in
a remote location sees the outline of our body, implants, and
medical devices, but not our faces?
On one hand, under the current pat-down system, a person
runs the risk of feeling violated by a TSA officer's roaming
hands. The passenger is publicly being "violated" or intruded
upon,1 15 but if he had chosen the new technology method, it is
unlikely that he would feel such a way because he would not be
as aware of the fact that he is being searched in public. How-
ever, on the other hand, perhaps this person has medical
15 TSA: Passenger Security Checkpoints, supra note 1. The TSA allows passen-
gers to request that their pat-downs be conducted in private. Id.
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problems or is self-conscious of someone seeing what is going
on under his clothes? What if a woman is very modest or comes
from a religion where modesty is demanded of her? Unlike a
pat-down where the TSA assigns an officer of the same gender
to perform the pat-down, 16 there is no guarantee that the per-
son looking at your naked silhouette is of the same gender as
you. One of the main complaints about the new technologies is
that screening officers can see intimate details of a passenger's
body, including breasts, genitalia, etc. However, TSA authorizes
its agents performing a pat-down to include "sensitive areas of
the body" to ensure security,' 17 and the TSA is no stranger to
complaints of its officers' "groping of passengers breasts, but-
tocks, and genitalia."' 1
8
While it would be difficult to argue that either method (the
old method of the pat-down or the new method of x-ray back-
scatter or millimeter wave scans) is minimally intrusive, it is hard
to assess which method is the least intrusive. 1 9 It is unclear
whether a backscatter x-ray scan or millimeter wave scan would
be "no more extensive nor intensive than necessary, in the light
of current technology, to detect the presence of weapons or ex-
plosives[ ] [and] that it is confined in good faith to that pur-
pose."'2 " However, it is important to remember that this new
technology is only being utilized for secondary screening, and
not on all passengers. 12' This is an example of the TSA trying to
use new technology to find less intrusive, but more effective ways
to detect the presence of threats after a passenger has set off the
magnetometer or is randomly chosen for secondary
screening.
122
The key for TSA to overcome arguments that its new develop-
ment is more of an intrusion than the old pat-down method is to
ensure travelers that they are using the technology in "good
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 Hearing, supra note 5.
119 Id. ("Because the application of administrative searches for aviation security
burdens the constitutionally protected right to privacy, Congress must insist that
all new physical screening techniques and technologies authorized be the least
intrusive necessary to accomplish the screening of aviation passengers, their bags,
and cargo.") (emphasis added).
120 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007).
121 TSA Tests, supra note 2.
122 TSA: Office of Privacy Policy and Compliance, supra note 59 ("TSA has
been testing various technologies that may enhance security without diminishing
the personal privacy of passengers at the security screening checkpoint.").
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faith" and only for the purposes stated (to prevent air piracy by
preventing contraband from getting onto a commercial
flight).' 23 This can be done by more stringent guidelines, re-
strictions, and supervision of the TSA officers operating the x-
ray backscatter unit, millimeter wave portal, or any other new
technologies that are developed. This certainly would help ap-
pease Barry Steinhardt of the ACLU, who is calling for legally
binding assurances that a privacy policy will remain intact.
124 If
Congress develops such guidelines and assurances that the pri-
vacy policy will remain in place and strictly enforced, the degree
of intrusion upon the traveling public's privacy may be more
reasonable.
B. PUBLIC NECEssrrY
There is no question that the world changed on September
11, 2001. Although security measures were already in place in
airports around the world, 125 the horrific events of that day
showed the world just how important airport security is and how
there was a need to strengthen the measures that were already
in place. The fear and shock of that day has led to the accept-
ance of the idea that airport searches are administrative
searches because the "post-9/11 world is now the same as a
'highly regulated industry. ' "1 26 Many people believe that the
"self-protective measures we have taken are reasonable and nec-
essary given the threats we face. 127
123 The TSA screening process searches people and baggage for contraband
such as guns, knives, and lighters. TSA: Screening Statistics, http://vw.tsa.dhs.
gov/research/screeningstatistics.shtm (last visited May 16, 2008). During 2006,
the TSA screened 708,400,522 people, with an average wait time of 3.79 minutes
and intercepted 13,709,211 prohibited items at security checkpoints. Id. Of
these confiscated items, 11,616,249 were lighters and 1,607,100 were knives. Id.
124 See Press Release, Barry Steinhardt, supra note 99 ("We [the ACLU] would
like to see strong independent and legally binding assurance that the policy will
be enforced and unchanged.").
125 Even before September 11, courts found that the need to deter and prevent
airplane hijacking was "unquestionably grave and urgent." United States v. Davis,
482 F.2d 893, 910 (9th Cir. 1973).
126 See Post Details: Airport Screening Searches No Longer Considered a Mat-
ter of Implied Consent; They Are Regulatory Searches, and They Are Not With-
out Limits, http://fourthamendment.com/blog/index.php?blog--1&title=airport
screening-searches no-longer-con&more=l&c=l&b=l&pb=l (Aug. 11, 2007,
9:10 EST). See also United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007)
(holding that airport searches are limited by their justification-screening for
terrorists).
127 Clark, supra note 29. Justice Souter aptly expressed the current sentiment
in his dissent in United States v. Drayton: "Anyone who travels by air today submits
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The most recent case on this topic, United States v. Aukai, dis-
cussed the necessity of airport searches:
More than 700 million passengers board commercial aircraft
in the United States each year. The Transportation Security Ad-
ministration ("TSA") is given the task of ensuring their safety, the
safety of airline and airport personnel and, as the events of Sep-
tember 11, 2001, demonstrate, the safety of the general public
from risks arising from commercial airplane flights. To do so,
the TSA conducts airport screening searches of all passengers en-
tering the secured area of the airport. 28
Current metal detection is no longer sufficient to adequately
safeguard passengers, as "hijackers ... know of the existence of
plastic explosives or even ordinary dynamite or contraband, and
these items do not necessarily react to a magnetometer
alarm.' 1 29 Even in 1973, almost thirty years prior to 9/11, the
technology was sufficient to push for new, more effective screen-
ing equipment, because at the time it was already possible to
minimize the amount of plastic explosives needed to blow up an
airplane and conceal such in a tube of toothpaste, using a foun-
tain pen as a detonator. 3 ' Now, with the advances in science
and technology, it is necessary to reform the current screening
process, which seems antiquated, and consequently inadequate,
considering it was put into place during a different era.
It is in the context of new technologies and their relationship
to new dangers that society must assess the constitutionality of a
search. Therefore, with the improvement of technology and the
prevalence of public concern over air terrorism, it is highly nec-
essary that the TSA continually adapt to society and evolve its
own screening mechanisms in order to prevent substances that
are undetectable under the current screening regime from pos-
ing a threat to passengers' safety. This argument alone is ex-
tremely persuasive in favor of balancing out the intrusion upon
the privacy of the traveling public. Further, if the TSA does not
try to utilize these new technologies, the commercial airline in-
dustry will likely suffer, as passengers either will be fearful that
to searches of the person and luggage as a condition of boarding the aircraft. It
is universally accepted that such intrusions are necessary to hedge against risks
that, nowadays, even small children understand." 536 U.S. 194, 208 (2002) (Sou-
ter, J., dissenting).
128 Aukai, 497 F.3d at 956.
129 James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Validity of Airport Security Measures, 125
A.L.R. 5TH 281 (2005).
130 United States v. Moreno, 475 F.2d 44, 49 (5th Cir. 1973).
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the security is inadequate as terrorists find new ways to outsmart
the outdated technology or will be just plain fed up with the
shoes-off, Ziploc bag, and no water bottle routine. The need to
revamp the screening process is apparent to both passengers
and government officials alike, and the TSA has responded ap-
propriately in trying to find a compromise between privacy,
safety, and efficiency. Whole body imaging seems to be just that
compromise.
C. EFFICACY
The final factor to weigh in analyzing the reasonableness of
utilizing the backscatter x-ray and millimeter wave devices in air-
port screening is the new technologies' degree of efficacy."' If
the new technology cannot better serve the industry's height-
ened security needs, the intrusion upon individual liberty and
privacy cannot be justified.'32 Further, if the technology does
not work, its ineffectiveness does not justify its cost.'33
There are concerns that the new technology is not any more
efficient then the system currently in place. Barry Steinhardt of
ACLU worries that a "very high percentage of the passengers
who opt for a scan will still wind up being physically searched
because TSA officials will have trouble distinguishing threaten-
ing objects from ordinary ones like a wallet."1 4 While it would
131 See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1275 (5th Cir. 1973).
132 One of ACLU's proposed principles of airline security is that "Physical
Screening Techniques and Technologies Must be Effective, or they Should not
be Utilized or Funded." In his statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, ACLU Legislative Council Timothy
Sparapani testified that "Congress should not allow TSA to fund or implement
physical [security] screening techniques and technologies that do not substan-
tially advance passenger aviation security." Hearing, supra note 5.
133 Just eight millimeter wave portals, such as the ones being tested in Phoenix,
cost $1.7 million, so to place these machines in airports across the country is a
hefty investment. Dirner, supra note 78.
134 Press Release, Barry Steinhardt, supra note 99. Sparapani from the ACLU
testified that:
X-ray backscatter technology's routine use likely will lead to in-
creased passenger screening delays and will certainly require subse-
quent searches for numerous passengers. For example, an image
projected by X-ray backscatter that may look like a concealed gun
or explosive device carried on a person will require TSA screeners
to put the person through: (a) a conventional metal detector; (b)
an explosives detection "puffer" machine; or (c) both. Further,
even if an object is identified, TSA screeners will then need to pat
the individual in question down and likely ask them to remove their
clothing to verify what the object in question may be. Even the
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be nearly impossible to keep every bad thing off of an airplane
or eliminate every threat to passengers, it is the TSA's pro-
scribed duty to try.'31 5 However, one of the TSA's new technolo-
gies, the ShoeScanner, that was being tested at the Orlando
International Airport, has already been nixed due to its ineffec-
tiveness when it failed to find explosives hidden in shoes. 136 On
one hand, it is reassuring that TSA is responding quickly to inad-
equacies in machines that are being tested, yet, on the other
hand, it is worrisome that new technologies are failing to track
materials that pose a threat to passengers' security. However,
TSA is continuing its trial-and-error testing to find a solution
that works. For example, the new technology has software that
can constantly be upgraded as technology increases. 137 This will
allow the TSA to continue to work out kinks in its system and
also be more effective in tracking technology, thus allowing the
machine to change with new developments, rather than adding
more bothersome security obstacles.
Proponents of the x-ray backscatter and millimeter wave ma-
chines have predicted that these new technologies will be the
solution to the delays and inefficiencies involved in the current
screening process.' 38 The walk-through magnetometer only
beeps when it detects metal, and it does not assist the TSA of-
presence of a seemingly innocuously shaped item, such as a pros-
thetic device or implant, will require subsequent (and potentially
humiliating) verification. Thus, X-ray backscatter requires a tre-
mendous invasion of privacy with little speed or efficiency gains.
Hearing, supra note 5.
135 TSA: Transportation Security Laws, http://www.tsa.gov/research/laws /law
_regulationrule_0010.shtm (last visited Jan. 21, 2008). The TSA was established
on November 19, 2001, in the wake of 9/11 by the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act. Id. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act gave the TSA
three major mandates, which include: "responsibility for security for all modes of
transportation; recruit, assess, hire, train, and deploy Security Officers for 450
commercial airports from Guam to Alaska in 12 months; and, provide 100 per-
cent screening of all checked luggage for explosives by December 31, 2002." Avi-
ation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
136 Thomas Frank, TSA Pulls Plug on Orlando's ShoeScanner, ABC NEWS, http://
abcnews.go.com/travel/story?id=3710258&page=1 (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
137 Grace Jean, Airports Test Alterative Technologies for Checkpoints, NAT'L DEFENSE
MAG., Oct. 2007, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2007/Octo-
ber/Airportstest.htm ("Because of the rapidly evolving terrorist threats to com-
mercial aviation, TSA is examining baggage and passenger screening
technologies that can adapt quickly to changing security requirements in air-
ports.... Such systems will have upgradeable software.").
138 See Better Imaging May Be Best Hope for Shorter Checkpoint Lines, AIR
SAFETY WK., Jan. 30, 2006, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mimOUBT/is_5_
20/ai n 16035538.
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ficers in locating contraband on an individual. Because of the
imprecise general alert signaled by the magnetometer, the use
of this device often heightens delays in airports security lines:
[B] ecause of the tight quarters most airport checkpoints have
been squeezed into, and the linear nature of their layouts, pas-
sengers who set off an alarm force the rest of the queue to wait.
Even if a person is pulled aside for a secondary scan and the line
can move, the search for the detected object has to start all over
again. In most cases, screeners don't really know what they're
looking for, or where exactly it is. Multiplied by hundreds of pas-
sengers and false alarms, this is a tremendous waste of time and
resources.
139
By utilizing the new whole body imaging methods such as the
ones discussed in this comment, screeners will not only be able
to quickly identify the object underneath a passenger's clothing,
but will know exactly where on the body to look for the object.
This will serve to cut down the lines passengers detest. Further,
if the whole body imaging devices can "see through" clothing, it
will no longer be necessary that we take it off, thus decreasing
the security wait time since passengers no longer have as many
steps to take before they can walk through a screening device.
Another of the magnetometer's fatal deficiencies is that it
only detects metal, yet we are now in an age where weapons are
not made exclusively of metal-as evident by the recent concern
over liquid explosives. Thus, having scanning devices that can
track the new dangers in air travel is vital. As it is impossible to
remove human error from the equation, TSA has sought to min-
imize such error by depending more on automated machines
(such as the millimeter wave portal) and perfecting the glitches
in such machines through trial and error. 140 Thus, it seems that
there is a strong likelihood that in the long run, the whole body
imaging will have a much higher efficacy than the current meth-
ods, therefore presenting a persuasive counterargument to the
invasion of privacy.
Public acceptance is an essential part of dictating the efficacy
of the new technology. Since it is currently voluntary, it cannot
help prevent contraband if people are not willing to use it. A
139 Id.
140 Id. L-3 Communications, the company that manufactures the millimeter
wave portal currently being tested by the TSA, is currently investing $25 million
each year for research and development and is working on new software algo-
rithms that will produce better resolution images and lower the probability of
false alarms. Id.
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study at Gatwick Airport, conducted by QinetiQ, to gauge feasi-
bility and public acceptance of new technology, similar to the
machines discussed in this paper, has "indicated that public re-
action to the possible introduction of this technology into UK
airports has been favorable, and that the performance of this
imager in detecting specific threat items concealed on passen-
gers, such as metal or ceramic weapons has been very encourag-
ing." ' 4' The TSA's trial of the backscatter x-ray machine has
already had favorable results, as they have reported that seventy-
nine percent of the public has opted to try the new backscatter
x-ray machine in lieu of the traditional pat-down secondary
screening method. 142 The millimeter wave machine has had an
even higher acceptance rate than the backscatter x-ray, with ac-
ceptance falling somewhere in the ninety percent range. 43 The
fact that the public has been so receptive to the new technology
will help allay some of the criticism of ineffectiveness or intru-
sion upon privacy. With such a large percentage of the traveling
public receptive to the new screening devices, it is likely that this
will only strengthen the "reasonableness" of these searches since
such a standard is based on society's expectations.
IV. CONCLUSION
Now imagine standing in a moving line at the Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport. After placing your bags on the
conveyer belt, you walk through portals while hardly breaking
pace. Your feet and body are warm because you are wearing
your shoes and jacket. Your pants are still sitting on your waist
because you do not have to take off your belt. Your wallet and
keys are still in your pocket, so you do not have to worry about
leaving anything important behind. You walk through a scan-
ner, pause for a few seconds (only a fraction of the time it would
have taken you to take off your shoes, jacket, belt, and empty
your pockets) while you engage in friendly banter with the TSA
agent who has escorted you. After the agent sees the green light
go off, indicating that you do not pose any danger to your fellow
travelers, you are ready to enjoy your vacation. You are once
again innocent until proven guilty, unlike under the antiquated
magnetometer system, which made you feel like a criminal sus-
pect just for traveling on an airplane.
141 CoMM'rl. ON ASSESSMENT OF SEC. TECHS. FOR TRANSP., supra note 90, at 57.
142 TSA Tests, supra note 2.
143 TSA Chiefs Goal: Win Back the Passengers, supra note 71.
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While you may have concerns with a TSA officer being able to
see a detailed outline of your body and whatever you are carry-
ing underneath your clothes, you know that he cannot see your
face. Unlike the intrusive pat-down, involving physical contact,
you can remain untouched while at the same time feel safer that
someone is watching you and your fellow passengers to make
sure that no one is carrying forbidden or dangerous items
aboard the aircraft. As are most things in life, this is a tradeoff.
Undoubtedly, as new technology becomes more prominent in
airports across the country, this particular issue will make it
before the courts sometime soon. In order to ensure that these
useful new technologies are not found to be violative of passen-
gers' constitutional rights and that the TSA will be able to con-
tinue implementing new methods to make traveling safer,
Congress needs to work with the TSA to set guidelines and assur-
ances that the new technology remains respectful of passengers'
personal privacy. Current public acceptance of the machines is
promising at the outset of the implementation of this new tech-
nology and should help allay privacy concerns and show that the
public appreciates the more efficient airport screening process
and thinks that it is reasonable. Once the privacy measures that
the TSA has in place are confirmed to be a substantial safeguard
against abuses, the balance will remain in favor of allowing TSA
to conduct secondary screening with new technologies, as there
is no doubt that there is a great need for screening measures
that have evolved to keep up with the increased technology in
air terrorism.
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